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Abstract: In recent neuroaesthetic discussion, neuroscientists have linked aes-
thetic pleasure to the brain’s reward systems, but they have also attempted to dis-
sociate it from utilitarian rewards and ultimately explain it as a disinterested state
of mind. This article examines this neuroaesthetic approach, juxtaposing it with
elements of phenomenological thought on the subject of aesthetic disinterestedness,
to present three interrelated concerns that can be raised from a phenomenological
perspective, as well as to outline how to overcome these problems phenomenologi-
cally. The article ends with the suggestion that neuroaesthetics, if it is ever going
to offer something important or useful regarding our understanding of aesthetic
experience, has to become phenomenologically sensitive and informed.
I. TWO DECADES OF NEUROAESTHETICS
Toward the end of the twentieth century, as neuroimaging methods and tech-
niques triggered sudden progress in brain studies, the first steps in the search
for a neurobiological basis of aesthetic experience were taken. Neuroscien-
tists who had previously focused their research on visual perception started
looking for the neural underpinnings of our experience of beauty in art, thus
establishing a new scientific discipline.1 Neuroaesthetics, so named by neu-
roscientist Semir Zeki, is today at the cutting edge of human brain research.
And it does not restrict itself to the investigation of the perception of beauty
in works of art or even beauty in general.2 Rather, neuroaesthetics has de-
veloped a broad scope covering all aspects of our relation to aesthetically
evaluable objects in art and nature.3
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Of course, the neuroaesthetic program has not escaped critique. Several
objections have been expressed regarding, for example, the process of re-
ductively deconstructing aesthetic experience into arbitrary elements in an
attempt to quantify them; the triviality of the core suggestion that we need
a brain in order to enjoy art; the neglect of crucial factors of aesthetic expe-
rience, such as the cultural and historical backgrounds of both subject and
object; the insufficiency of neuroaesthetic concepts for discussing multilay-
ered individual artworks; the narrow attempt to relate aesthetic interest to
the erotic reflex; the reduction of personal experience to sub-personal brain
functions; and the neglect of our bodily and worldly relation with things.4
With a few notable exceptions, though, neuroaesthetics has not been a
point of focus for the phenomenological community.5 This is probably be-
cause the neuroaesthetic paradigm is part of the more general program of
naturalising consciousness, which has itself become a repeated target of phe-
nomenological arrows. Without doubt, the systematic articulation of a gen-
eral and detailed phenomenological critique of neuroaesthetics would be more
than welcome. Such a project would have to draw heavily on the classical phe-
nomenological critique of the intentionality-blind psychologism of attempts to
found logic, mathematics, and the normative sciences in general on empirical
psychology. This path of critique would, more particularly, illuminate the
need for seeking the essential and not only the factual conditions that render
aesthetic consciousness possible. A systematic phenomenological criticism
would, moreover, have to question neuroaesthetics’ metaphysical presuppo-
sitions and discuss the constitutional role of consciousness. Neuroscientists
basically work within the paradigm of realism unquestionably presupposing
the independent existence of both physical reality and of the scientific objects
of their research. Phenomenology, on the contrary, investigates how all dif-
ferent levels of reality are constituted for and are given to consciousness; in
this sense, it has a lot to offer regarding aesthetic consciousness in particu-
lar. In that same direction, a phenomenological criticism of neuroaesthetics
would have to emphasise our intentional relation with aesthetically evaluable
objects and shed light on how their aesthetic significance becomes manifest.
Consciousness is not a box or a container and conscious mental acts are not
relations to its immanent contents. Phenomenologically viewed, conscious-
ness is intentional, which amounts to saying that it functions precisely as
openness to transcendent objectivities that are always given with a certain
meaning; they matter to us – embodied subjects within the world – perceptu-
ally, cognitively, practically, ethically, and, of course, also aesthetically. These
crucial aspects of how meaningful objectivities are constituted for conscious-
ness and are given to it in the specific way they are given escape the theoret-
ical armory and the methods of neuroscientific research. But, furthermore,
phenomenological criticism would have to question representationalist and
reductive accounts of aesthetic experience, paying attention to the difference
between causal explanations and phenomenological elucidations. According
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to the mainstream neuroscientific model of the mind, our epistemic relation
to physical reality is explained by assuming mental representations produced
on the basis of causally determined neuro-chemical brain processes. A line of
thought like that, however, ignores the subjective aspects of undergoing an
experience. These subjective aspects cannot be captured by a third-person
neuroscientific causal account. Phenomenological descriptions, on the other
hand, aim at elucidating precisely the subjective, phenomenal, qualitative
dimensions of our lived-experience including those of our aesthetic conduct.
A final and equally important point that should be mentioned here is that
the exploitation of neuroscientific findings leads to the formulation of nat-
ural laws. Such laws, though, describe things as they are and not as they
ought to be under the prism of truth, goodness, or rightness. The appropri-
ate phenomenological criticism would, thus, have to point out the limits of
the inductive generalisations of neuroaesthetic research and stress the neuro-
scientifically untraceable dimension of aesthetic normativity.
In the present article, I choose to set aside these more general lines of
thought. Instead, I will direct my critical focus toward the, so to speak,
smaller issue of aesthetic disinterestedness and the way it is dealt with in
neuroaesthetics. Neuroscientists basically refer to this philosophical notion by
pointing in a rather vague and general way to Kant’s Third Critique without
discussing its theoretical dimensions, neither within the context of Kantian
philosophy nor with regard to subsequent varied interpretations. Disinterest-
edness is, thus, unquestionably presupposed as a main characteristic of aes-
thetic experience, the neuro-physiological substrate of which neuroaesthetic
research seeks to determine. My principal aim in the present article is to show
that neuroscientists’ preconception about the philosophical idea of aesthetic
disinterestedness is flawed. By examining how this notion is addressed by
neuroscientists, and by juxtaposing this with elements of phenomenological
thought on the subject, I aim to reveal an important theoretical deficit that
plagues neuroaesthetic discussion. More particularly, I intend to show that
while neuroaesthetics has accumulated important empirical findings, it lacks
the analytic tools to interpret them in a way that is both theoretically sound
and true to aesthetic experience from a first-person perspective. As it op-
erates with a rather limited set of concepts and/or with binary oppositions
in its discursive approach to a rather complex phenomenon, its explanatory
value and its phenomenological accuracy are overly compromised.6 My final
suggestion – briefly – will be that neuroaesthetics, if it is ever going to of-
fer something important or useful regarding our understanding of aesthetic
experience, has to become phenomenologically sensitive and informed.
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II. THE REWARD SYSTEM AND AESTHETIC
DISINTERESTEDNESS
One of the first important findings within neuroaesthetics was the association
between aesthetic experience and brain reward mechanisms. Experimental
results suggest that aesthetic experience is related to activation of a region
of the medial orbitofrontal cortex belonging to the brain’s reward system.
Semir Zeki and Vilayanur Ramachandran have attempted to explain this by
emphasising our epistemic relation to works of art.7 Zeki’s basic assumption
is that the brain is able to capture, and therefore know, within the vast
amount of data processed, the stable and essential elements of the things we
perceive. And according to Zeki, the artist does exactly what our visual brain
does: organises visual data, abstracts the inessential elements, and maintains
the essential characteristics of the represented thing in each case.8 Similarly,
Ramachandran claims that art presents the essential elements of perceptual
objects, albeit selectively accentuated, tapping into something that facilitates
their recognition and is supposedly central for eliciting aesthetic experience.9
Both Zeki and Ramachandran, then, claim that our access to what is essential
(and hence to knowledge or recognition) is accompanied by satisfaction, by
pleasure registered in the brain’s reward circuits.
But to construe aesthetic experience as a state that simply brings satis-
faction is highly restrictive and problematic. First, it is a rather simplistic
picture that does not correspond to the richness or multifaceted nature of
aesthetic phenomena in practice. Second, this picture cannot contribute to
the differentiation of the aesthetic experience from other experiences that
seem alien or irrelevant to it, such as the satisfaction given by food or drugs.
In order to overcome these issues, neuroscientists are now seeking new data
and offering more elaborate theories. Of utmost importance is the attempt to
distinguish aesthetic pleasure from other pleasures that also have their neural
correlate in the brain’s reward systems. In particular, research is exploring
whether aesthetic pleasure is related to the reward mechanism of disinter-
ested liking and not the distinct reward mechanism of wanting.10 That is to
say, neuroscientists treat aesthetic pleasure as a reward independent of the
satisfaction of desires.11
This idea is based on Kent Berridge’s extensive research work on the
brain’s reward systems. Experimenting with rats, Berridge and his colleagues
have shown that ‘liking’ and ‘wanting,’ which normally function together,
are dissociable subcomponents geared around reward and have distinguish-
able neural substrates.12 ‘Liking’ here denotes neural or behavioral hedonic
reactions and not the subjective experience of liking something.13 By phar-
macologically blocking dopamine release, or even by destroying dopamine
neurons, the researchers found that appetitive seeking (‘wanting’) was dra-
matically reduced, whereas ‘liking’ reactions remained completely intact.14
After the destruction of their dopamine cells, the rats stopped eating; they
would actually starve to death if not force fed. Nevertheless, they continued
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to have ‘liking’ reactions when given sweet solutions. In contrast, chemical
manipulation of the endogenous opioid system revealed an alteration or even
a complete reduction of ‘liking responses to sweet stimuli, whereas ‘wanting’
reactions were left unimpaired. The researchers thus found that ‘liking’ is
mediated by opioid and cannabinoid neurotransmitters in the limbic system,
while ‘wanting’ is mediated by the distinct mesolimbic dopaminergic system.15
Such dissociations of liking and wanting have also been observed in humans.
For example, individuals on drugs that block dopamine ‘are less inclined to
act to get what they want, a state called “psychic indifference” in the clinical
literature,’16 even though ‘they do not change how much they like objects’.17
By independently delineating ‘liking’ behaviours, neuroscientists believe
they have discovered the brain network that sustains all kinds of pleasure. Ac-
cording to this ‘common currency’ reward network hypothesis, the ‘[p]leasures
of food, sex, addictive drugs, friends and loved ones, music, art, and even
sustained states of happiness can produce strikingly similar patterns of brain
activity’.18 Aesthetic pleasure is thus explained as having its neural underpin-
ning in the liking reward mechanism instantiated in the opioid and cannabi-
noid systems of the brain. Crucially, though, Anjan Chatterjee, a principal
proponent of this view, also rushes to clarify that this does not mean that
aesthetic pleasures coincide with mere appetitive likings. He contends that
‘[e]ven though our pleasures funnel through the same deep brain systems, to
say that our pleasure in art is the same as the pleasure we receive from tasting
sugar would be silly’.19 So, in contrast to appetitive likings, which normally
go hand in hand with wanting, adherents to this theory suggest that aesthetic
pleasure is a disinterested liking that occurs without activating the dopamin-
ergic systems that sustain wanting. As Chatterjee and Vartanian put it, ‘[t]he
mental activity of [aesthetic] disinterested interest may reflect activity in the
liking system without activity in the wanting system’.20 In the eyes of leading
neuro-researchers, this is the proper way to approach aesthetic experience in
congruence with its philosophical construal as a cognitively and emotionally
disinterested state. Furthermore, in order to delineate the special character
of aesthetic pleasure, they argue that, in contrast to liking food, drink, or sex,
aesthetic pleasure is part of a broader experience that is emotionally nuanced
and cognitively penetrated.21
III. PHENOMENOLOGICAL WORRIES
A closer look at how aesthetic disinterestedness is treated in neuroscientific
discussion reveals several misconceptions that result from neuroaesthetics’
theoretical-phenomenological weaknesses.22 The following sections present
three interrelated concerns that can be raised from a phenomenological per-
spective, as well as the basics of how to overcome these problems phenomeno-
logically.
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III.a Disinterestedness as presupposing real existence
The starting point for a phenomenological clarification of the essential char-
acteristics of aesthetic disinterestedness has to be the abstention from any
concern regarding existence. When we aesthetically contemplate an object
or event, we are indifferent regarding its actual being.23 This crucial factor
is hardly considered by neuroscientists, who confuse the notion of aesthetic
disinterest with indifference in the most ordinary sense of our comportment
toward things in our empirical reality.
In our everyday lives, we continuously posit the being of actual objects
and events in which we are interested or about which we are indifferent. For
instance, I might like ice cream, dislike yogurt, and feel indifferent about milk.
But in such cases, I always presuppose the actual existence of those consum-
ables. Husserl calls such feelings ‘object feelings [Gegenstandsgefühle]’ or ‘ac-
tuality feelings [Wirklichkeitsgefühle]’ and makes clear that they are founded
on a belief in existence.24 Even the adiaphoron (ἀδιάφορον) is existentially
present for me, or, more accurately, existentially presupposed. The fact I am
indifferent toward it does not mean that I do not posit its real being.
From a phenomenological standpoint, aesthetic disinterest is not indiffer-
ence in the ordinary sense. This is a recurrent theme in Husserl’s thought. In
the Logical Investigations – where it is first mentioned – but also in his famous
letter to Hofmannsthal, the texts gathered in the Husserliana volume Phan-
tasy, Image Consciousness, and Memory, the first volume of Ideas, and his
late working texts, Husserl insists that aesthetic contemplation (Betrachtung)
has nothing to do with questions regarding the existence of the appearing ob-
ject; aesthetic experience is disconnected from the being or non-being of its
object. So, for example, in his working notes from December 25, 1931, where
he discusses the method of the phenomenological epoché in comparison to the
aesthetic stance, he contends that:25
the aesthetic stance is not a ‘disinterested’ stance in the ordinary
sense. [. . . ] The indifferent [Gleichgültige] [in the ordinary sense]
can be and actually is taken, considered, and again left, in its ex-
istential validity [Seinsgeltung], but is not – as in aesthetic seeing
– bereft of its actuality.26
According to Husserl, aesthetic experience always involves neutralisation
of belief, even when we engage with real objects. He uses here the metaphor
of the ‘image’ to refer to the manner of appearing, for example, of aesthetic
objects of nature. In a manuscript from 1906 he asks, ‘Why does nature,
a landscape, [sometimes] act as an ‘image’?’27 In response, he attempts
to describe the disconnection, so to speak, of the seen landscape from its
perceptual horizon and its ordinary givenness as actual, which momentarily
turns the landscape into a quasi-actual appearance. As Husserl notes at
another point: ‘[i]n a certain sense, I can view anything as an “image”. I
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inhibit all actual belief; I have no interest in the thing’s reality and take it as
an image, as [e.g.] “mountain”.’28 Certainly, the positing of the real existence
of the landscape remains in the background, but we do not carry it out. In
Husserlian parlance, we ‘do not live in belief’.29 Rather, we live in aesthetic
valuing, which excludes positional performance.30 This important point will
be further clarified in the next section, where I will discuss how the different
attitudes one can adopt are related.
III.b The idle liking-without-wanting
Neuroaesthetic analyses entirely disregard the suspension of belief discussed
above and thus fail to capture the essential nature of aesthetic disinterest-
edness. This is not the only flaw, though. In addition, neuro-researchers
typically equate aesthetic disinterestedness with an absence of wanting. But
what kind of absence is that? We have seen that rats, and let us suppose
humans, are incapable of wanting when their ability to process dopamine is
removed. However, not being able to want is not the same as not wanting.
And not being able to be interested is not the same as being disinterested. It
is true that suspension of belief in the existence of an aesthetically evaluable
object or event pauses our pragmatic concerns. This pause, though, does not
eliminate our practical concerns, something that would, in fact, abolish even
the possibility of praxis. Instead, this pause leaves open the possibility of
switching from one attitude, such as the aesthetic one, to another cognitively
or practically oriented one. We can draw on Husserl’s remarks in order to
shed light on this.
In Ideas II, Husserl explains that, in the aesthetic attitude, we abandon
ourselves to what is aesthetically given and live in the performance of the
aesthetic act.31 This is then our principal act (Hauptakt) and the aesthet-
ically given thing is our principal (though not theoretical) theme; it is our
‘main thing’ (Hauptsache). If we change our attitude and adopt a theoretical
stance in order, for example, to objectify, explicate, and describe a beautiful
appearance, this becomes the stance we live in and its correlate objectivity
becomes our principal (now theoretical) theme. And yet our previous aes-
thetic intentions are not lost. They remain ‘lifeless’ in the background.32 As
Husserl puts it:
I can live in the sorrow, the joy, the pleasure; or I can be oc-
cupied with the object perceptually, conceptually, judgementally,
and still experience the feeling ‘in the background,’ though with-
out living ‘in it’.33
This is true for all acts that cease to be principal:
Cognitive acts, acts of pleasure, volitional acts do not simply dis-
appear when we no longer carry them out from the standpoint of
the ego; they become background lived-experiences.34
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It could, thus, also be that our theoretical interest is somehow aroused
while we are living in aesthetic consciousness, and that these open theoret-
ical intentionalities remain in the background even though we do not follow
them. The theoretical theme, then, does not become principal; it takes on a
‘supporting’ or ‘collateral’ role within the context of aesthetic experience.35
For Husserl, aesthetic disinterestedness, as the absence of interest in pur-
suing cognitive and practical goals, is always embedded within a horizon of
cognitive and practical inactualities that are, nevertheless, potential actuali-
ties. However absorbed we might be in our aesthetic experience or however
caught up with an aesthetic object, the horizon of our potential praxis (cog-
nitive or practical) continuously supports our aesthetic attitude. This latent
horizon codetermines whose aesthetic experience it is and what it is overall
to have such an experience. Without this horizon, aesthetic experience is
at risk of collapse on both epistemic and phenomenological levels. And we
would then be faced with a pathological situation whose examination would
be unable to reveal the proper nature and disinterested character of aesthetic
experience.
But it is not only that aesthetic experience has a horizonal structure of
open praxial possibilities. Contrary to what neuroscientific descriptions make
us assume, aesthetic experience does not imply an absolute absence of interest
such as experienced in the case of, for example, intense boredom. As phe-
nomenological analyses reveal, the aesthetic attitude comprises a very special
interest and, in this sense, comprises a special turning toward, which could
be well described in terms of motivation, tendency-toward, and striving. In
Husserlian terms, an aesthetic experience involves an ‘aesthetic interest’36 di-
rected toward the how of the object’s appearance.37 This notion of aesthetic
interest is of great significance, especially given that suspension of existen-
tial commitment and bracketing of praxis are necessary but not sufficient
components of the aesthetic stance. It is not enough to delineate aesthetic
consciousness as consciousness ‘directed toward what appears and what is to
be described irrespective of its being and nonbeing’.38 According to Husserl,
aesthetic consciousness must be ‘directed toward what appears in its respec-
tive “manner of appearing”. The manner of appearing alone is aesthetic’.39 It
alone is the ‘bearer of aesthetic feeling-characteristics [Gefühlscharaktere]’.40
Comparing aesthetic experience with an act of phantasy, in which we are di-
rected toward an irreal object without contemplating it aesthetically, renders
this plain. This is why Husserl claims that ‘What is essential for the aes-
thetic attitude, therefore, is not phantasy, but the focusing on what interests
me aesthetically, the objectivity in its How’.41 If we do not contemplate the
manner of appearing, we are not living in aesthetic consciousness.
III.c Aesthetic disinterestedness and the attenuation of emotion
Another way in which researchers in neuroaesthetics deal with aesthetic dis-
interestedness is to associate it with a state of psychical distance and, more
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specifically, emotional attenuation.42 The idea here is that, in encountering
works of art, cognitive processes related to art expertise intervene and regu-
late our emotional responses, achieving a kind of emotional dissociation that
facilitates proper aesthetic appreciation. This is based on the work of the
cognitive psychologist Helmut Leder. Leder and his colleagues have investi-
gated how laypersons and art experts differ in the way they respond to visual
artworks. On the basis of participating subjects’ self-reports and physiolog-
ical reactions measured using facial electromyography, the researchers found
that emotional response to artworks was less extreme among the art experts
examined.43 This, supposedly, is ‘in line with the Kantian notion that an
aesthetic stance is emotionally distanced’.44 This reasoning has subsequently
been adapted and presented in neuroaesthetically oriented discussions. Chat-
terjee and Vartanian are quite explicit on the matter:
some recent behavioral evidence suggests that experts may be
more capable of adopting a stance reflective of disinterested inter-
est than novices. [. . . ] [Leder and colleagues’] findings are con-
sistent with the Kantian notion that adopting an aesthetic stance
is emotionally distanced, at least among people knowledgeable
about visual arts.45
However, the idea of treating disinterestedness as a matter of reducing the
intensity of emotive response via cognitive modulation of emotion is problem-
atic. Aesthetic disinterestedness, phenomenologically illuminated as suspen-
sion of any positing of belief, does not occur by degrees. In turning toward an
object aesthetically, we might experience pleasure or displeasure, which can
have gradations. And the aesthetic object can be given with different degrees
of evidence, placing it further from or closer to its optimal givenness. But
indifference to existence is not graded.
We cannot have, as it were, a little bit of ‘as if’ belief in the existence
of something. Of course, we might be ambivalent about how much we like
something, but even then we maintain a non-positing aesthetic attitude. And
this is certainly different from doubting the existential status of that which is
aesthetically given. Indeed, Husserl argues that such doubt is the enemy of
the aesthetic stance. In one text he gives the example of seeing a mannequin
in a wax museum and explains that when we move back and forth from the
positing perception of a real man to the non-positing image-consciousness
of a fictional man, the image is not ‘clearly set apart from reality’.46 Here,
image-consciousness does not last long because of the high degree of similarity
between the mannequin and the real human being. And since we lack ‘peace-
ful and clear consciousness of imaging,’ which grounds aesthetic pleasure, any
delight we might get in such cases is far from aesthetic.47
In fact, the non-positing character of aesthetic pleasure (or displeasure)
can explain the distancing inherent to our aesthetic encounters with persons,
objects or events, which is independent of how much we like or dislike them,
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how positively or negatively we evaluate them, or any ambivalence we feel
in this respect. Moreover, phenomenologically, this distance is not a kind of
detachment that comes with the limitation or elimination of further feelings
evoked besides aesthetic pleasure (or displeasure) in the how of the object’s
givenness. Aesthetic experience can be highly emotional, eliciting intense
feelings like joy, sadness, pity, fear, compassion, etc. Husserl’s observations
on the involvement of various feelings awakened in artistic contexts can help
us deal with this issue.
It may well be the case that such feelings arise in the face of images
(broadly meant) that present real persons, things or events: the bust or the
portrait of a historical figure, photographs, a movie based on actual facts,
and so on. Those are, then, genuine positing feelings (object or else actuality
feelings) that presuppose belief in the (past, present, or future) actual exis-
tence of their intentional objects. Various feelings may also arise in the face
of fictional persons, objects or events. Even then, the fear, pity, sorrow, joy,
sadness, etc., we might feel when encountering fictional themes in a painting,
sculpture, movie, theatrical play, or novel are, according to Husserl, genuine
feelings:
The miserably tormented person in the picture awakens my com-
passion. I actually have a feeling [Gefühl] of compassion, just as I
actually have a thing intuition, indeed, a thing perception. But it
is a modified feeling. The ill person in the image is pitiable; he is
the ‘poor’ sick person. [. . . ] Like any feeling, it [i.e. compassion]
helps constitute something about the subject matter that pertains
to it ‘intuitively’.48
Husserl further clarifies that such genuine feelings in the face of irreal
themes are non-positing:49
If a delight (or sorrow) is directed toward a mere image object,
then it is nonpositing delight [or sorrow].50
But what does this non-positionality mean? Let us discuss this via the
example of the fear we feel when encountering, say, a poisonous snake. Such
a fear is an object-feeling founded on belief in the real existence of the live
snake. Confronted with a toy snake, by comparison, we can approach it and
touch it without a trace of fear. We would only feel fear if we believed,
mistakenly, that the toy snake was a real, living snake. Accordingly, while
watching an actor playing with a toy snake that is presented as such, we feel
fear neither in empathising with the actor, as real Egos worried for his or
her safety, or as phantasy Egos projected on stage. But we may feel fear if
the toy snake is presented as real and dangerous in the ‘as if’ world of the
theatrical play. In that case, our fear would be founded on a quasi-belief in
the ‘as if’ reality this particular object has within the fictional world of the
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play. Whereas the aesthetic pleasure we might take in a snake is exclusively
a matter of the how of its givenness, irrespective of whether it is alive, a toy,
a painting, or a vision in a dream, other emotions elicited within such an
artistically relevant context presuppose its quasi-existence. We can say that
such modified acts (compared to being directed toward actual, non-fictional
objects) are quasi-actuality feelings.51 Understanding the character of non-
positionality as quasi-positionality can also phenomenologically explain the
distance we experience when we are emotionally engaged with fictional objects
or events. But, again, the distance inherent to how we relate intentionally to
fictions has nothing to do with the attenuation of emotion about which Leder
and his colleagues speak. The first is a qualitative moment of our experience,
while the second denotes intensity of feeling.
The quasi-actuality feelings aroused by fictional objects or events, like the
actuality feelings aroused, for example, by nature, or by images and repre-
sentations of real persons, objects or events, are not in themselves aesthetic.
However, they can play a significant role in our aesthetic experiences. Husserl
claims that the way actuality feelings or quasi-actuality feelings fluctuate be-
longs to the ‘manner of appearing’ toward which aesthetic consciousness is
directed. The actuality or quasi-actuality feelings ‘can combine with ways of
exhibiting, and the like, into a unity’52 and in this sense codetermine aesthetic
objectivity. And, importantly, the combination of disinterested pleasure with
actuality or quasi-actuality feelings enhances aesthetic delight.53
It becomes clear from the above that, while neuroscientists take aesthetic
disinterestedness to be a state of psychical distance susceptible to grada-
tion and accomplished through proper emotional attenuation, Husserlian phe-
nomenology (i) treats it as being a qualitative character independent of the
intension of aesthetic pleasure or other aroused feelings; and (ii) shows that
the actuality or quasi-actuality character as also the fluctuation of these feel-
ings positively affect the aesthetic experience. Phenomenologically speaking,
it is thus misguided to consider a layperson’s response to artworks as less, or
not at all, disinterested, and hence less properly or less genuinely aesthetic
on the basis that the higher order acts associated with expertise are absent
in their case. Disinterested aesthetic pleasure is equally possible for both art
novices and art experts independently of top-down cognitive penetration, or
even, importantly, in the absence of such penetration. A short clarification is
in order here.
Aesthetic pleasure (or displeasure) belongs to feeling-intentionalities and,
according to Husserl, is always founded on some objectifying act. This means
that it always presupposes an already constituted object, or objectivity in
general, toward which, or, more accurately, toward the how of the appear-
ance of which, it is directed. Of course, our aesthetic attitude may con-
cern objectivities that are correlates of other founded acts. These can be
intuitive, like how the aesthetic pleasure we take in a painting presupposes
image-consciousness, which itself is founded on the perception of the physical
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bearer of the picture. Or they can be higher-order intentionalities that in-
volve conceptualisations, theoretisations, and idealisations, like the aesthetic
pleasure we take in literature, or even in a scientific proof or theory. At the
undermost level of transcendent experience, though, aesthetic pleasure (or
displeasure) is founded on simple perception, which is not itself a founded
act. Husserl speaks about this originary aesthetic experience in terms of
‘value-(re)ception [Wertnehmung]’ (namely evaluative perception, analogous
to ‘per-ception [Wahrnehmung]’).54 In such experience, perceptual spatio-
temporal objects charged with value-characters appear to us. For example,
beauty is given in the originary intuitional act of value-reception as an objec-
tive character of the object, as ‘value-objectiveness’.55
Undoubtedly, aesthetic experience is a complex state that involves an
interplay of affective and higher order cognitive dimensions. Husserlian phe-
nomenology points, however, to the possibility of a primordial aesthetic state,
an originary act of value-reception, which transcends simple perception of
mere natural things and, when founded on ‘simple objectivating perception’,
precedes acts of predicative thinking, explicit identification, classification,
content interpretation, etc.56 The possibility of such a primordial aesthetic
state, which is existentially disinterested in the phenomenological sense dis-
cussed, is open to everyone irrespective of their artistic education.
IV. FINAL REMARKS
The above discussion has, hopefully, clarified that neuroscientific preconcep-
tions regarding aesthetic disinterestedness are theoretically naïve and that
neuroscience’s experimental findings have been interpreted using theoretical
tools that in many regards are misguided. As I show, this has involved over-
looking crucial notions such as the absence of belief in real existence; the
suspension of pragmatic concerns that, however, maintain a horizon of open
possibilities; the interest in the how of the appearance of the aesthetic object;
the distinction between actuality feelings and aesthetic pleasure; the phe-
nomenologically interpreted engagement and detachment of quasi-actuality
feelings involved in aesthetic experience; and the founded character of feeling-
intentionalities and the possibility of some primordial aesthetic pleasure. In
addition, whereas neuroaesthetics is supposed to deal with aesthetic experi-
ence, it seems it has great, not to say unsurpassable, difficulties explaining
what precisely, phenomenologically speaking, it is that makes an experience
aesthetic.
Intense research conducted during the last two decades may have led some
to believe that the discipline of neuroaesthetics had come of age.57 How-
ever, critical evaluation of the qualitative assertions made by neuroscientists
reveals a discipline that lacks solid theoretical foundation. This is the clas-
sical – for the genesis and development of a science – case of accumulating
a plethora of important empirical/laboratory data yet lacking the necessary
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philosophical/theoretical context to classify, organise, and explain the results
achieved. Contemporary neuroaesthetics appears in need of an explicit, co-
herent theoretical framework to delineate and determine its subject matter,
to describe in detail all the different levels of consciousness’ functions and the
various parameters involved in aesthetic experience in particular, and to ap-
propriately interpret its rich empirical findings. If (neuro-)empirical research
is to positively contribute to our understanding of aesthetic experience, it
should be theoretically/phenomenologically informed and grounded. But a
dialogical relation with neuroaesthetics would also benefit phenomenology,
with empirical research contributing to the updating, readjustment, refine-
ment, and deepening of phenomenological concepts and positions, as well as
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